Mnangagwa at 84: What Russia tells us about Zimbabwe’s changing foreign policy
By Barnabas Thondhlana
As President Emmerson Mnangagwa turns 84 on September 15, few relationships better illustrate the changing character of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy under his leadership than the country’s increasingly warm ties with Russia.
The relationship is not new. Its roots reach back to the liberation struggle, when the Soviet Union supported Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and supplied it with military assistance. But independent Zimbabwe’s relationship with Moscow was considerably more complicated than the simplified narrative of old Cold War allies often suggests.
Robert Mugabe’s government was initially closer to Beijing than Moscow. Indeed, Mugabe’s ZANU received little Soviet support during the liberation struggle, with Moscow instead backing ZAPU. Relations between Harare and Moscow were consequently cool during much of the 1980s.
It was only later, particularly as Zimbabwe’s relations with Western governments deteriorated, that Moscow became a more important diplomatic partner.
Under Mnangagwa, however, the relationship has acquired a new strategic significance.
From liberation history to strategic partnership
Mnangagwa’s foreign-policy doctrine after taking power in 2017 was built around “engagement and re-engagement”. His government sought to repair relations with Western countries while simultaneously strengthening ties with China, Russia and other non-Western powers.
Russia fitted neatly into this strategy.
Moscow had little interest in lecturing Harare about Zimbabwe’s domestic political system, while Zimbabwe regarded Russia as a useful counterweight to Western pressure and sanctions.
The relationship also offered something more tangible: access to capital, technology, military cooperation and investment in Zimbabwe’s mineral resources.
Mining has been at the centre of the relationship.
The Russian-Zimbabwean Great Dyke Investments project was conceived as a major platinum development, with the potential to become one of Zimbabwe’s biggest mining investments. Russian interests also became involved in Zimbabwe’s diamond sector through Alrosa.
The attraction is obvious.
Zimbabwe sits on enormous deposits of platinum-group metals, lithium, diamonds, gold and other strategic minerals. Russia, meanwhile, is a major mining and metals power with a geopolitical interest in securing long-term relationships with resource-rich African states.
For Harare, the partnership offers an alternative source of investment and technology.
For Moscow, Zimbabwe offers access to strategic minerals and a politically friendly government in southern Africa.
Mnangagwa and Putin
The personal relationship between Mnangagwa and Vladimir Putin has become an important component of the partnership. Mnangagwa attended the Russia-Africa Summit in St Petersburg in July 2023, where he met Putin. The Zimbabwean president expressed support for greater Russia-Africa cooperation and linked the relationship to food security and economic development.
The symbolism was significant.
At a time when much of the Western world was condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Harare was making clear that it would not automatically follow the Western position.
Zimbabwe has generally sought to maintain what it describes as an independent foreign policy, but its diplomatic positioning has repeatedly put it closer to Moscow’s worldview on issues such as sanctions, sovereignty and a multipolar international system.
That relationship was strengthened further in May 2025, when Mnangagwa travelled to Moscow and met Putin at the Kremlin. The Kremlin described Zimbabwe as an important partner, while Mnangagwa’s government presented Russia as a country willing to assist Zimbabwe’s development.
The significance of that visit went beyond ceremony. It demonstrated that Russia had moved from being a historical diplomatic relationship to becoming one of the pillars of Mnangagwa’s external strategy.
But where are the economic dividends?
This is where the relationship deserves closer scrutiny. The political relationship is undoubtedly warm. The economic record is more complicated.
Zimbabwe has announced ambitious mining and investment projects involving Russian interests, particularly in platinum and diamonds. Yet some of the major projects have struggled to translate announcements into the scale of production, jobs and export earnings initially envisaged.
That position reflected several longstanding themes in Zimbabwean foreign policy: opposition to Western sanctions, suspicion of Western geopolitical intervention and support for what Harare describes as a multipolar world order.
Mnangagwa subsequently made his position clear during his 2023 meeting with Putin.
For Zimbabwe, the calculation is partly pragmatic.
The country has experienced years of Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Moscow’s argument that sanctions are an instrument of geopolitical pressure therefore resonates with Zimbabwe’s own political narrative.
But there is another calculation.
Russia offers Zimbabwe a relationship in which Harare can position itself as a sovereign actor rather than as an ally required to conform to Washington or Brussels.
This is particularly important as Zimbabwe seeks to diversify its diplomatic and economic relationships.
Russia is also looking for Africa
The relationship should not be viewed solely through Zimbabwean eyes.
Russia has been rebuilding its presence across Africa, seeking diplomatic allies, commercial opportunities, military partnerships and access to strategic resources.
The Russia-Africa summits are part of that broader strategy.
Zimbabwe is attractive because it has natural resources, a strategically located economy in southern Africa and a government that has demonstrated a willingness to maintain friendly relations with Moscow despite Western pressure.
The relationship therefore serves both sides. Zimbabwe gains another powerful diplomatic partner. Russia gains another African government willing to engage Moscow at a time when its relations with much of the West remain deeply strained.
The military dimension
Security cooperation is another area that warrants attention.
Zimbabwe and Russia have discussed military-technical cooperation, including defence equipment and training.
This is significant because Zimbabwe’s military has historically relied heavily on a mixture of Soviet/Russian, Chinese and other equipment.
Closer Russian military ties therefore make practical sense for the Zimbabwe Defence Forces.
The minerals question
Perhaps the most important issue going forward is Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth.
The global scramble for critical minerals has dramatically increased the country’s strategic importance.
Platinum-group metals are essential to several industrial applications. Lithium has become central to the global energy transition. Zimbabwe also possesses significant gold, diamond, chrome and other mineral resources.
Russia wants access to resources.
Zimbabwe wants investment and technology.
That creates a potentially powerful bargain.
But it also creates a potential vulnerability.
Zimbabwe must ensure that its relationships with Russia, China, the United States, Europe, Britain, India and other investors produce genuine value for Zimbabweans rather than simply turning the country into a source of raw materials.
The central question should therefore not be whether Russia is a friend.
It should be:
What does Zimbabwe gain from the friendship?
A relationship likely to survive Mnangagwa
As Mnangagwa reaches 84, the Russia relationship has become part of his foreign-policy legacy.
He has moved Zimbabwe towards a more openly multipolar diplomatic posture, while continuing to insist that the country remains open to engagement with the West.
Russia has become an important component of that balancing act.
The relationship has survived changes in Moscow, Harare and the international system. It has survived the end of the Cold War, the death of the Soviet Union, Mugabe’s complicated relationship with Moscow and Zimbabwe’s subsequent isolation from the West.
Under Mnangagwa, it has acquired a new economic and geopolitical dimension.
Yet the ultimate test will not be the number of presidential meetings or diplomatic statements.
It will be measured in mines producing at scale, Zimbabweans employed, technology transferred, infrastructure built, exports generated and government revenue collected.
That is the unfinished business of the Russia-Zimbabwe relationship.
As Mnangagwa enters his 85th year, his Russian legacy will therefore be judged less by how warmly Moscow welcomes him and more by whether the partnership helps Zimbabwe convert its extraordinary mineral wealth into broad-based economic development.
For all the rhetoric about strategic friendship and a multipolar world, that remains the bottom line.
